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Recently, renewed attacks have been leveled at the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA). These attacks contend that the Act
should be replaced with some sort of federal or state no-fault work-
ers' compensation system.2 The charges leveled against FELA are
that: (1) fault-based liability is against the developing trend of mod-
ern tort law and out of step with the widespread adoption of workers'
compensation schemes generally for industrial injuries; (2) the re-
sults under FELA are unpredictable; (3) the process is unduly pro-
tracted; (4) the administrative costs and settlement payouts are ex-
cessive; and (5) the procedure is adversarial, fostering divisiveness
between employer and employee and discouraging rehabilitation of
the injured worker.
An examination of the available data indicates that these charges
are either unsupported or demonstrably incorrect. FELA serves as a
real and valuable incentive to promote employee safety in the rail-
road industry, which remains one of the most hazardous in this
country. FELA's cost of operation is commensurable with that of
comparable workers' compensation systems and it is not an unduly
slow procedure. Its results are tailored to the individual needs and
losses of the injured worker. Finally, FELA is no more adversarial
* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. A.B. 1956, Yale Univer-
sity; M.A. 1958, Cambridge University; J.D. 1961, Yale Law School.
1. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Schwartz & Mahshigian, The Federal Employers' Liability Act, A
Bane for Workers, A Bust for Railroads, A Boon for Lawyers, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1
(1986); Havens & Anderson, The Federal Employers' Liability Act: A Compensation
System in Urgent Need of Reform, 34 FED. B. NEws & J. 310 (1987).
than workers' compensation programs, and probably less so. Overall,
FELA is a fairer system than workers' compensation in both design
and operation.
In recent years state and federal workers' compensation systems
have come under a variety of substantial attacks for costliness, inad-
equacy of benefits and of coverage, rigidity of application, and basic
unfairness.' These charges raise the fundamental question of
whether or not the trend should be toward a FELA type of system,
and away from workers' compensation schemes, rather than the
other way around.
The railroad industry is concerned with the continued applicability
of FELA to railroad injuries and occupation-related diseases because
they foresee burgeoning claims for occupational injuries and diseases
that may not become manifest until after employee retirement.4
FELA would cover such claims, but workers' compensation would
not. As will be discussed below, it is debatable whether an employer
could escape tort liability for such claims. Even under a workers'
compensation system, railroads may not escape liability due to devel-
oping tort exceptions to the exclusivity provisions for intentional in-
juries. The more fundamental issue, however, is whether the rail-
roads should escape liability for such injuries. The fair answer is
that they should not.
THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
The Federal Employers' Liability Act was passed in 1908, 5 as a
means of providing a reasonably reliable tort compensation system
for workers in the dominant American railroad industry, which was
causing an appalling number of injuries and deaths per year. FELA
preceded the wide adoption of workers' compensation systems in this
country. It retained the tort characteristics of fault-based liability
and compensatory damages based upon actual damages suffered,
rather than upon a fixed or arbitrary scale of benefits. FELA
adopted a pure comparative fault standard, except that assumption
of risk was no defense in cases where the employer was guilty of
negligence per se in violating a federal safety statute or regulation."
In 1910 FELA was amended to provide concurrent state and federal
3. See infra notes 32 & 88 and accompanying text.
4. See I Ass'n of Am. R.R. Steering Committee, Federal Employers' Liability
Act Study (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) [hereinafter AAR
Report].
5. The Act as originally passed in 1906, 34 Stat. 232, was struck down in Howard
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908), owing to the Court's finding that the Act
unconstitutionally regulated intrastate commerce.
6. See 45 U.S.C. § 53.
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jurisdiction and nonremovable venue in any jurisdiction where the
defendant resided or did business, or where the cause of action
arose.7 In 1939 Congress eliminated the defense of assumption of
risk, established a three-year statute of limitations, and made it a
crime for any person to attempt to prevent the furnishing of infor-
mation relating to the injury or death of an employee.8
In a series of decisions, notably Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
road' and Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,1" the United
States Supreme Court broadened and liberalized the definitions of
fault and proximate cause as applied under FELA. Rogers held that
a jury question of fault is presented if "employer negligence played
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for
which damages are sought."" In Gallick the Court ruled that a jury
question of causation is presented where there is "evidence that any
employer negligence caused the harm, or, more precisely, enough to
justify a jury's determination that employer negligence had played
any role in producing the harm."1 2 The salutary effect of these deci-
sions was to present a jury question of fault and causation in all but
the clearest instances. As a result, FELA cases generally are decided
by a panel of one's peers.
FELA AS A SAFETY INCENTIVE
One commentator has contended that the "railroad industry is one
of the safest industries today," and that the need to provide incen-
tives for railroads to make their industry safer by means of a FELA
system of tort liability "no longer exist[s] today."13 These assertions
are simply not borne out by the evidence.
A current economic study of the railroad industry shows that it
continues to be one of the most dangerous occupations in the Ameri-
can economy.14 This study reports that from 1975 to 1984, "high
speed and mile-long trains, hazardous commodities and drastic elimi-
nation of employees" contributed to an injury rate in the railroad
industry that was "fifty percent higher than the average for the en-
7. 45 U.S.C. § 56; 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1973).
8. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 54, 56, 60.
9. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
10. 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
11. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 506.
12. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. at 116.
13. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 2.
14. Oldfather, FELA - Is it Time for Change? 2 (1987) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
tire economy."1 5 In addition, the study notes that almost all of the
railroad crafts "work outside in all weather by day and by night on
all days of the year, often on risky footing on or near moving equip-
ment."16 The 1983 amputation rate for railroad employees, the study
found, "was 58% greater than that for all U.S. industry," and the
fracture rate 114% greater.17 During the 1975-1985 decade, "953
on-duty railroad employees were killed and 532,033 were injured."18
A November 1987 report of The Railway Labor Executives' Associ-
ation (RLEA) states that "[o]ver the last decade, an average of al-
most 49,000 rail workers have been injured each year," resulting in
an average per-year injury of "1 out of every 10 rail employees." 19
The railroad industry is not only a hazard to its employees, but a
substantial and growing danger to the public at large as well.
Ninety-five percent of the railroad accident fatalities in 1985 were
sustained by nonemployees, such as motorists at railroad crossings.20
A 1987 report of the Illinois Public Action Council (IPAC) states
that for the decade 1976-1985 an average of 1253 non-employees
were killed per year in railroad accidents .2 That same report notes
that approximately 25% of the 500 major rail accidents reported in
the New York Times between 1975 and 1987 "involved toxic sub-
stances, explosives, hazardous waste or nuclear material, '2 2 and that
"[a]lmost one in ten rail cars involved in accidents now contains haz-
ardous materials. '2 3 Furthermore, the report states that the amount
of hazardous substances "as a percentage of total rail tonnage," is
"rapidly increasing." '24 The number of "rail-transported nuclear
spent fuel shipments increased ten times from 1975 to 1985," and
the "Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress esti-
mates that rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel will be involved in
from one to five rail accidents per year by the year 2000.' ' 25
Railway safety "is not covered by OSHA [Occupational Safety
and Health Act]" but instead is covered by the Rail Safety Act
which, according to the RLEA report, "does not provide incentives
15. Id. at 1-2.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIvEs' ASS'N, FELA - A MATTER OF RAILROAD
SAFETY, INJURY COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 7, 12 (1987) (em-
phasis original) [hereinafter RLEA REPORT].
20. Oldfather, supra note 14, at 2.
21. ILL. PUB. ACTION COUNCIL, RAILROADING THE PUBLIC SAFETY 2 (1987)
[hereinafter IPAC REPORT].
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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for compliance with safety regulations."26 The report further points
out that "[rail companies know they can be fined only if they fail to
correct hazards after they are found by an inspector," with the result
that "in 1986 the FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] imposed
fines that average only about $10 per cited defect. 27 The IPAC re-
port states that the FRA "has not required strict compliance with
the amended power brake rules," and that trains "regularly leave
terminals with little or no inspection. '28 The report also states that
the FRA "is ignoring the increasingly widespread failures by the
railroads to report accidents and incidents as required by law."' 29
Thus, it is apparent that governmental regulation does not function
as an adequate safety incentive for the rail industry.
Nor can a no-fault workers' compensation system be relied on to
provide the necessary safety incentive for the railroad industry. A
recent study of the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice indi-
cates that the less the injury costs to an employer, the less inclined
the employer is to correct its safety problems. 30 It is well docu-
mented that workers' compensation payments are generally less than
tort awards, especially for the more serious injuries.31 Workers' com-
pensation premiums do not provide an adequate safety incentive to
employers. Although the employers of about 80% of the nation's em-
ployees that are covered by workers' compensation are experience-
rated (that is, workers' compensation premiums are based, in part,
on the company's safety record), there is no indication of any sub-
stantial correlation between such ratings and increased workplace
safety.32 According to IPAC, the predictability of workers' compen-
26. RLEA REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 13.
27. Id. at 13. In a letter dated June 3, 1987 to the Hon. John J. Exon, Jr., Chair-
man of the United States Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, James R.
Snyder, Chairman of the Safety Committee of RLEA, states that "out of 311,000 de-
fects discovered by FRA inspectors in 1986, only $3.1 million in fines were imposed last
year, or about $10 per defect." As one writer notes, because government agencies "are
subject to political pressures" and may relax safety enforcement "to advance an Execu-
tive's political agenda," such enforcement should be backed up "with the strong general
deterrence provided by tort law." T. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation
and Employer's Liability 36, 38 (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
28. IPAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
29. Id. at 19.
30. RAND CORP. INST. FOR CIv. JUST., AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM
YEARS 59 (1986).
31. See Oldfather, supra note 14, app. G at 72-73.
32. J. Phillips, The Relationship Between the Tort System and Workers' Compen-
sation - The True Cost 7-8 (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (citing
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 96-97 (1972)).
sation payouts, whether in insurance premiums or self-insured liabil-
ity, encourages the employer practice "of trading the lives of em-
ployees and low, predictable compensation benefits for short-term
profit." 33
The fault-based FELA system, with its compensation exceeding
the typical workers' compensation award (particularly for the more
serious injuries), is designed to serve as a real and present safety
incentive. A recent study of the Consumer Federation of America
concluded that the tort system, "[b]y assigning responsibility for ac-
tions . . . is one of the strongest mechanisms in our capitalist society
for ensuring that the profit motive is pointed toward positive achieve-
ments. 3 4 The comparative fault aspect of FELA35 serves as an in-
centive to employee safety as well.
By contrast, the Steering Committee for the Association of Ameri-
can Railroads (AAR) strongly advocated replacing FELA with some
sort of no-fault workers' compensation scheme. Among other things,
they foresaw "the burgeoning onset of occupational illness claims
compensable under the FELA now sweeping the country," including
a "great increase in hearing loss claims" and the increase "at an
alarming rate" of "[a]sbestos-related claims. ' 3 The Steering Com-
mittee also noted "a recent rash of alarming jury awards," including
"the $58 million of judgments against the Norfolk & Western Rail-
road Company in the recent dioxin cleanup cases."37 However,
IPAC points out that the "railroads knew of these hazards for
years," but "took no corrective action until lawsuits were filed
against them under the FELA.' ' 83 The Council also notes that work
disabilities and diseases that are discovered after an employee retires
or leaves the work force are not compensable under workers' com-
pensation plans.39 Such injuries are compensable, however, under
FELA.40
The AAR may be mistaken in believing that tort liability can be
avoided under a workers' compensation scheme for injuries from
workplace dangers of which the employer was aware but took no
corrective action. Such liability may fall within an intentional mis-
conduct tort exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of workers'
33. IPAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 49.
34. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., THE BENEFITS OF THE MODERNIZATION OF THE
TORT LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR IMPROVED SAFETY AND
QUALITY IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 2 (1987).
35. 45 U.S.C. § 53.
36. AAR Report, supra note 4, at 11.
37. Id.
38. IPAC REPORT, supra note 21, at 8; see also id. at 45-47.
39. See id. at 47.
40. Id.
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compensation law.41 Furthermore, workers' compensation coverage
would not avoid liability for toxic spills such as those cited by the
AAR, since such claims largely involve tort liability to non-employ-
ees. In any event, the suggested motive for replacing FELA with a
workers' compensation scheme must sit ill indeed with an American




One of the persistent attacks against the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act is that it is too expensive due to the high administrative
costs and large awards. Once again, the data does not support these
criticisms.
In an in-depth 1952 study of the Illinois workers' compensation
system, Alfred F. Conard and his associates found to their surprise
that the FELA system was significantly less expensive to operate
than the state workers' compensation scheme. They found that the
ratio of total cost to benefits paid under FELA was approximately
one-fifth to four-fifths, while under workers' compensation the ratio
was one-third to two-thirds.42 Operating costs were at least 50%
more expensive in every category of expenditure for workers' com-
pensation, as compared to FELA.43
The primary reason for this disparity in costs, they concluded, was
the significantly greater involvement of attorneys in workers' com-
pensation claims as opposed to FELA claims. Conard and his associ-
ates noted that workers' compensation boards or commissions gener-
ally "frown upon an employee's appearing without counsel" because
of the difficulty of the issues involved, such as defining "arising out
of and in the course of employment" and the "extent of injury. 44
They found that attorneys were involved in only 1.6 to 5% of the
FELA claims, while they were involved in 90 to 98% of the nonfatal
and approximately 25% of the fatal workers' compensation claims.45
41. See Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d
465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
42. A. CONARD, R. MEHR, B. HEDGES, G. HILL, P. JOHNSON & J. LISTEN, COSTS
OF ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR WORK INJURIES IN ILLINOIS 1-2 (1952) [hereinaf-
ter A. CONARD].
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 9, 41.
45. Id. at 29, 32, 39; see also Oldfather, supra note 14, app. G at 75. "In 1975
attorneys were hired in 48% of the permanent partial disability cases, 66% of the perma-
Conard and his associates concluded that the smaller size of workers'
compensation payouts relative to railroad injury payments "has a
negligible effect on the higher ratio of aggregate claimants' expense
in these cases."'48 These researchers prophetically noted that "mis-
conceptions may not be confined to the relative costs, but may ex-
tend to many other features of both systems. 47
The conclusions of this study are borne out by contemporary re-
search in the area. The Oldfather study concluded that in 1985 the
"estimated reparations costs as a percent of total operating expense
were 2.2% in the inter-city bus industry and 2.4% in the rail indus-
try."'48 The study found that in 1982 injury expense as a percentage
of operating expense was 2.7% for the coal industry and 2.2% for
railroads.49 Thus, railroads compare favorably in this regard with
both a relatively safe (bus) industry and a relatively dangerous
(coal) no-fault workers' compensation industry.
Comparing the rate of increase of expense, adjusted for inflation,
the Oldfather study found that the rail injury expense increased by
42% between 1970 and 1984, while workers' compensation expense
increased by 129% during the same period. 50 Between 1972 and
1984 inflation-adjusted compensation and medical payments under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)
increased by 286%.51 During the same period, inflation-adjusted rail
injury expense increased only 34%.52
Oldfather studied a representative sample of 2645 FELA cases
closed by attorneys during the 1982-1985 period. He found that 76%
of these cases resulted in settlements of $100,000 or less, and 55%
settled for $50,000 or less.53 The 1985 cost to the railway industry
for all injury expenses (including both employee and non-employee
injuries) was 2% of total operating revenue; this compares favorably
with industries that are under workers' compensation systems.54
Moreover, the railroad industry has become quite profitable since de-
regulation in 1980;55 therefore, railroad difficulties cannot be used as
nent total disability cases and 63% of the death cases," (citing VII INTERDEPARTMENTAL
WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, A SURVEY OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION CLOSED CLAIMS 153 (1979)).
46. A. CONARD, supra note 42, at 50.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Oldfather, supra note 14, app. A at 27.
49. Id. app. D at 49-50.
50. Id. app. E at 61.
51. Id. app. E at 62.
52. Id.
53. Id. app. I at 88. Oldfather also notes that "[o]nly I 1 cases involved settlements
of $1 million or more," or .4% of all cases. Id.
54. Id. summary at 2. The percentage of FELA cases tried to verdict is 2%, as
compared with 3.5% for the tort system as a whole. Id. app. I at 89.
55. Id. app. C at 38-39. During the period 1980-1985 net operating revenue of the
railway industry "averaged $2.3 billion per year," net ordinary income "averaged $1.76
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an argument against the higher payouts of FELA as opposed to a
workers' compensation system.
The RLEA states that "85% of FELA cases are settled without
the worker hiring a lawyer."' 56 Only 1.1% of FELA cases are settled
in court while there is a much higher percentage of litigated cases in
workers' compensation cases. For example, 13% of workers' compen-
sation cases were litigated in Mississippi while 27% were litigated in
Illinois. 57
The 1983 AAR study supports these cost findings. It observes that
"[a]bout 85 percent of the claims closed in 1981 were settled di-
rectly between the railroads and the claimants.158 Of the remaining
15% represented by attorneys, 5% were settled without suit being
brought and 88% were settled before trial.5 9 This study also notes
that "[a]pproximately 4[%] of the claims" representing 58% of the
total payout were settled for $75,000 or more, while "[flully 88[%]
of the claims were settled for less than $25,000 and accounted for
about a fifth of total payout."160 These settlements were "determined
primarily by the economic loss sustained by the claimant. ' 61
The AAR study concluded that the railway industry paid out $366
million in FELA claims in 1981, and that a simulated payout of the
same claims under LHWCA, reduced to present value, would result
in a payment of $417 million.6 2 A comparable payout under the Illi-
nois workers' compensation program would have cost $344 million,
only 6% less than the FELA payout.63
FELA-related administrative costs for eleven selected carriers ex-
amined in the AAR study showed that these costs ranged from 11%
to 31% of the actual FELA payout.64 These figures suggest that op-
erating costs are in significant part a function of railroad efficiency
in administering the compensation program, rather than of the pro-
gram itself.
billion per year," and return on shareholders' equity "averaged 7.7% per year."
56. RLEA REPORT, supra note 19, at 5, 6. Some idea of the magnitude of work-
ers' compensation appellate litigation can be gained by reviewing the reported workers'
compensation cases in the Decennial Digest for the periods 1976-1981 and 1966-1976.
For the 1976-1981 period these reports fill 1156 pages of Vol. 33; for the 1966-1976
period, they fill two thirds of Vol. 44 (1057 pages) and all of Vol. 45 (1509 pages).
57. Id. at 5.
58. AAR Report, supra note 4, at 24.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 28.
62. Id. at 49.
63. Id. at 69.
64. Id. at 32.
One of the repeated charges made against the FELA system is
that plaintiffs' contingent attorney fees are exorbitant - according
to one commentator such fees can be as high as forty percent of the
FELA award.65 The AAR study, however, notes the FELA practice
is a limited field because the rail unions traditionally have recom-
mended only a few well-known tort lawyers who handle FELA suits
for a flat 25% contingent fee rather than the 33.3% contigent fee
which is the standard in the personal injury area.66
Other Costs
Critics of FELA level other charges not directly related to its
monetary cost, but nevertheless challenging its efficiency as a com-
pensation system. They contend that the process involves undue de-
lay, discourages rehabilitation, provides improvident lump sum set-
tlements, is divisive, and makes unpredictable awards. An
examination of each of these criticisms shows that they lack factual
basis and present no significant difference from a workers' compen-
sation system; furthermore, they involve value judgments that, on
balance, weigh in favor of FELA.
By the railroads' own admission, the typical length of time from
date of injury to date of settlement cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered excessive. The 1983 AAR study showed
that the median time for this purpose "was nearly three months. 67
The median number of months from filing to disposition of a federal
diversity tort claim ranges from fifteen to twenty months, according
to the 1984 annual report of the Administrative Office for United
States Courts. 6 As already noted, only a small fraction of FELA
claims ever result in the filing of a suit.69 Moreover, railroad workers
are entitled to various sickness and disability benefits that help to
cushion any delay in settlement. 0 In any event, delay in payment is
a matter that primarily concerns claimants, and railroad employees
widely support FELA rather than a workers' compensation program
for railroads.
The AAR study illustrates the railroads' disbelief that the FELA
compensation system discourages rehabilitation. As they frankly ad-
mit, "most workers in the rail industry can be relied upon to want to
65. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 9.
66. AAR Report, supra note 4, at 79.
67. Id. at 22. By contrast, the mean number of days required to settle a contested
death case in workers' compensation, according to a United States Deptartment of Labor
study, "was 544 days." Oldfather, supra note 14, app. G at 76.
68. T. Haas, supra note 27, at 4 n. 23 (citing the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 291 (1984)).
69. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
70. Railroad employees are entitled to various sickness and disability benefits as a
matter of course. See AAR Report, supra note 4, at 37-40.
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return to work, rejoin their peers, and enhance their opportunities for
promotion, rather than sit at home. ' 71 Their 1981 survey showed
that the "vast majority" of FELA claimants, namely 89% returned
to their previous jobs.72 Their study also found that "[o]ver half" of
the claimants in their twenties and thirties who were permanently
totally disabled for railroad work took jobs elsewhere.7
In his 1952 study of the Illinois workers' compensation system,
Professor Conard found that the "large majority" of employers and
employees preferred payment in a lump sum to payment in the
weekly installments provided by the law, and that "qualified infor-
mants estimated that 80 to 85% of cash benefits are so paid. 74 On
the other hand, the AAR study reported that structured settlements
were used in a significant number of FELA cases, particularly for
cases involving settlement amounts of $75,000 or more.75 This study
found the structured settlement technique to be of particular interest
because "it closely resembles the central feature of no-fault compen-
sation systems."7 6
Moreover, it seems that the use of a lump sum or a structured
form of settlement should be based on the agreement of the parties,
rather than upon a form of settlement imposed by law. It is much
too rigid to assume that all claimants are incapable of managing a
lump sum settlement, or that a lump sum settlement would not be
preferable for claimants in some instances.
Critics of FELA contend that it encourages divisiveness between
employees and employers. 77 Such assertions are unsupported by any
evidence. It is worth noting that a number of states have found it
necessary to provide a civil remedy against retaliatory discharge for
filing a workers' compensation claim. A 1981 article found that
eleven states provided such a remedy78 and a 1986 article found that
the number of jurisdictions providing such a remedy had risen to
twenty-seven, 9 indicating that the problem is a growing one for
workers' compensation claimants. If there is any validity to the un-
71. Id. at 62.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id. at 51.
74. A. CONARD, supra note 42, at 37.
75. AAR Report, supra note 4, at 20.
76. Id.
77. Havens & Anderson, supra note 2, at 314.
78. McGarry, Retaliatory Terminations in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 44
TEx. B.J. 617 (1981).
79. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Worker's Compensation Claim: The
Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 554 (1986).
supported assertion that FELA claims are divisive, the substitution
of a workers' compensation remedy seems unlikely to provide any
solution and might make matters worse.
As previously noted, 0 most FELA claims are settled without the
intervention of an attorney, and such cases presumably are settled
amicably, creating no friction. A lawsuit typically is filed only in the
cases involving serious injuries and permanent disability, where the
employee often is unable to return to work with the railroad.81 In
such cases, there should be no continuing friction between such em-
ployees and the railroad. Most important, the claimant has a legal
right to assert his claim - any refusal of the railroads to respect this
right is reprehensible and should be combatted actively whenever
and wherever encountered. This problem should not be evaded by an
attempt to change to a workers' compensation system which will
likely provide no solution to the problem anyway.
When facing unpredictable awards, the railroad industry itself ad-
mits that recovery of lost wages is the central issue in the majority of
FELA claims, and that the total settlement value of a FELA claim
is determined primarily by the economic loss sustained by the claim-
ant. 2 A "high payment" judgment will often become the standard
by which similar cases are judged in the future.8 3 Professor Conard
puts the matter more succinctly: "[w]e have no doubt that the abil-
ity of claimants to recover judgments furnishes the adjusters' mea-
sure of the fair value of [a FELA] claim." '84
The Procrustean approach of workers' compensation schemes to
the question of damages fails to take adequate account of the indi-
vidual circumstances of each case. Professor Conard notes that rela-
tively few workers' compensation cases can be solved by reference to
the schedule.8 5 Workers' compensation does not allow recovery for
pain and suffering. Pain and suffering and diminished enjoyment of
life constitute a very real item of damage. The tortfeasor who inflicts
an injury should bear the burden of any uncertainty in calculating
the damages associated with that injury.
There is no evidence that any significant number of meritorious
FELA claims result in the denial or undercompensation of recovery.
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that workers' compensa-
tion claims generate a large amount of litigation, principally over
questions of the extent of damage and whether the claim "arose out
80. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 60 & 73 and accompanying text.
82. AAR Report, supra note 4, at 22, 28.
83. Id. at 28.
84. A. CONARD, supra note 42, at 26.
85. Id. at 41.
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of or in the course of employment."' 6 It is unclear whether, or how
many, meritorious workers' compensation claims result in a denial of
recovery, but it is clear from the very nature of the system that a
large number of such claims are significantly undercompensated.8 7
CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS
Matters of cost and efficiency in the operation of a compensation
system must in all events give way to the paramount concern of fair-
ness. When measured by the standard of fairness, it is evident that
FELA clearly outdistances no-fault workers' compensation programs
in this country.
Workers' compensation has come under repeated attacks for ex-
cessive rigidity, underinclusiveness of coverage, and undercompensa-
tion. 8 A number of tort-claim exceptions - such as intentional mis-
conduct, the dual capacity doctrine, and third-party claims for
contribution and indemnity - have developed as a reaction to the
exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation laws, 9 indicat-
ing a general dissatisfaction with workers' compensation as the ex-
clusive remedy for workplace injuries.
It has been recognized that tort litigation serves a number of valu-
able goals in addition to that of compensation for injury.90 It pro-
motes deterrence. It reinforces the dignity of the individual. It gives
the claimant a feeling of participation in the system, and a sense of
86. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Conard also notes that FELA, 45
U.S.C. § 56, allows a claimant three years after the cause of action accrues to file a
claim, while the much shorter statute for workers' compensation claims shows "striking
instances of inadvertent loss of claim." See A CONARD, supra note 42, at 49.
87. Oldfather notes that while many workers' compensation statutes "purport to
award 66% of the injured worker's wage loss, most workers do not receive that amount."
Oldfather, supra note 14, app. G at 73. Moreover, since the percentage is fixed by a
ceiling based on the average weekly wage for the jurisdiction, higher paid employees are
substantially penalized by this ceiling. Railroad employees are among this group of
higher paid employees, since the average wage for such employees in 1985 was $2,916
per month. Id. app. G at 73, 74 & 77.
88. See, e.g., J. Phillips, supra note 32 and authorities cited therein; DeLeon,
Workers' Compensation: A Legal System in Jeopardy, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 337
(1979).
89. See Rust, New Tactics for Injured Workers, Oct. 1987 A.B.A. J. 72; Marks,
Status of the Exclusive Workers' Compensation Remedy: Actions by Employees
Against Coemployees, Employers and Carriers, XXII TORT & INS. L.J. 612 (1987);
Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation
Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1983).
90. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 5-15
(1986); Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 615-616 (1985);
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-1173.
vindication against unjust treatment. These are values that should
not lightly be discarded in our democratic society.
CONCLUSION
The charges that are leveled against the FELA tort system of
compensation do not hold up under scrutiny. Employment in the
railroad industry continues to be hazardous, and the industry is in
need of the deterrent effect of a tort liability system. FELA is less
expensive to administer than no-fault workers' compensation
schemes. Compensation under FELA is more individualized and eq-
uitable than workers' compensation. More important, FELA is fairer
in operation than workers' compensation. The question is not
whether FELA should be changed to a workers' compensation sys-
tem, but whether workers' compensation should be changed to a tort
system like FELA.91
91. Haas advocates making an alternative tort remedy available to workers. This
has been proposed by others and is the rule in England. He notes that the quid pro quo
rationale originally used for adopting workers' compensation in lieu of a tort remedy
would hardly pass muster today, since the defenses of assumption of the risk, contribu-
tory negligence and the fellow-servant rule - which the workers' compensation statutes
were designed to obviate - would have little or no vitality in tort law today. See T.
Haas, supra note 27, at 1-2, 18-22.
